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 Profile 
 
Palestinian Demography Fertility: A Gender Informed Perspective 
 
The Palestinian demographic picture has recently been the focus of much attention 
primarily because of its apparent deviation  from  what is generally expected or 
predicted by researchers and analysts, especially those who utilize the demographic 
transition model to explain or predict population changes. Often cited as having one 
of the highest fertility rates in the world, Palestinian fertility behavior is at issue in 
that, despite overall substantial socio-economic changes having taken place during 
the past three decades, and despite evidence that infant and child mortality have 
continued to fall over the years1, a generally 'high'- although with some evidence of 
gradual decline2-  fertility pattern remain unyielding. 
 
How then, can we understand Palestinian fertility and demograhic patterns? What 
are some of the emelements that contribute to this fertiltiy puzzle? Are the 
assumptions about Palestinian fertility based an accurate assessment of the 
Palestinian reality? Here, we will first attempt to shed some light on these questions 
by examining the international debate and discourse on the subject in order  to 
inform present day discussions of Palestinian demography and fertiltiy. A review of 
Palestinian demographic and fertility patterns will follow, utilizing some of the 
concepts and frameworks used internationally to assess demographic and fertility 
patterns in societies undergoing socio-economic change. Finally, an attempt will be 
made to integrade key issues and themes into a  gender sensitive population policy 
framework for Palestinians. 
 
The Demographic Transition: Mortality and Fertility 
 
                                                          
1 See Hill, A., The Palestinian Population of the Middle East, Population and 
Development Review, Vol. 9, No.2., June, 1983,  Heiberg and Ovensen, 
Palestinian Soceity in Gaza, West Bank and Arab Jerusalem, A survey of Living 
Conditions, Fafo Report 151, Norway, 1983, pp. 49-65. 
2 Tamari, S. and Scott, A., Fertility of Palestinian Women Between the 
National Perspective and Social Reality, Shu'un al-Mar'a, No.1, 1991, pp.155-186 
( In Arabic). 
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Generally speaking, demographic transition refers to changes in fertility and mortality 
levels that occur during the transition from 'traditional' to 'modern' society. Within the 
classical  framework, societies undergo transition from high to low fertility and 
mortality as modernity sets in. Here, the decline in mortality that accompanies 
'modernization'  and socio-economic development is seen to be followed by a 
decline in fertility, but only after a transitory period of high population growth, 
followed by a slowing down of growth caused by the fast decline of both fertility and 
mortality3.  However, based on evidence generated from the developing world of 
persistent high fertility despite socio-economic change and mortality reduction,  
classical demographic theory came under scrutiny and criticism, leading to calls for 
the incorporation of other theories of social change to replace the classical 
demographic transition model. 
 
Alternative theoretical currents arose around the concept of demographic transition 
in an attempt to explain existing developing world demographic realities, and in the 
face of  excessive population growth, famine, unemployment and environmental 
degradation, especially in the African continent. These currents are broadly  based 
on  culturalist, feminist, and marxist postulates4. The culturalists maintain that the 
                                                          
3 Caldwell, J,The Soft Underbelly of Development: Demographic Transition in 
Conditions of Limited Economic Change, in Fisher, S. et al (editors)  Proceedings 
of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1990, 
Washington D.C., World Bank, 1991, pp.207-253; Levy, M.L., The Demographic 
Transitions (Les transitions Demographiques), Population et Societes: Bulletin 
Mensuel d'Informations Demographiques, Economiques, Sociales, 207, 1986, 
pp.1-3; Miljanic, M., Demographic Transition Theory: Theory or Model, 
Stanovnistvo, 30-31, 1992, pp.5-20. 
4 Pice, V and Pirier, J., Theories of Demographic Transition: Towards a 
Certain Convergence, Sociologie Et Societes, 22(1), 1990, pp.179-192. 
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classical transition theory does not take into account cultural influences and 
individual decision making,  whereby culture is placed in an auxiliary - and static - 
role because of  the problematic assumptions on modernization5. However, and 
especially for our purposes,  the purist version of this  framework  which 
encompasses Islam as a religo-culture -where the low status of women defined by 
Islamic cultures is singled out as a main cause of persistent high fertility among 
Islamic societies and groups within society6 - is seriously flawed. The problem with 
such a framework is that on the one hand, it fails to make the necessary conceptual 
link between cultural and social structural factors (such as economic, patriarchal, 
familial and political) to explain high fertility among muslim nations and groups, thus 
omitting to examine socio-economic indicators of high fertility as a principal mode of 
analysis. Indeed, it has been argued and shown that fertility in muslim cultures is 
more of a function of sociological and epidemiolgical determinants than of 
theological doctrine7. On the other hand , this perspective  also fails to recognize 
Islamic religion and culture as highly diverse, and influenced by the socio-economic 
and political conditions within which they are embedded. For instance, it has been 
shown that  Islamic doctrine can be used to justify different policies for women and 
their reproductive choices, and that the ways in which women's rights are affected by 
religious doctrine are a direct result of the ideology of groups in power 8. In other 
words,  although muslim natality is universally high, considerable diversity exists 
among Islamic nations9, linked to the diversity of the geopolitical, and socio-
                                                          
5 Hayes, AC, The Role of Culture in Demographic Analysis: a Preliminary 
Investigation,  Working  Papers in Demography No. 46, Australian National 
University, Research School of Social Sciences, Canberra, Australia, 1994. 
6 See for instance, Roudi, N., Nagi, M.H., Trends and Differentials in Moslem 
Fertility, Journal of Biosocial Science, 16(2), 1984, pp. 189-204; The Demography of 
Islam, Population Today, 16(3), 1988, pp.6-9, Courbage, Y., Demographic 
transition Among Muslims in Eastern Europe, Population, 46(3), 1991, pp.651-677.; 
Ahmed, G, Rights and Status of Women in Islam and Causes of High Fertility 
among Muslim Women, Presentation at the International Population 
Conference/Congres international de la Population, Montreal, Canada, Augst 24-
September 1, 1993, sponsored by the International Union of the Scientific Study of 
Population. 
7Omran, A.R., Epidemiologic, Sociologic and Theologic Aspects of Muslim 
Fertility, in Blake, R.R.(ed) Final Report on International Workshop on 
Communications in Family Planning Programs, Teheran, Iran, 6-18 June, 1970, 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, University of North Carolina, Carolina Population 
Center,, 1971, pp.32-55. 
8 Obermeyer, C.A., Reproductive Choice in Islam: Gender and State in Iran 
and Tunisia, Radical America, 25(3), 1992, pp.23-36. 
9 Weeks, J.R., The Demography of Islamic Nations, Population Bulletin, 
43(4), 1988, pp.5-54; Nagi, M.H., and Stockwell, E.G., Muslim Fertility: Recent 
Trends and Future Outlook, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 
6(2), winter, 1982, pp.48-70. 
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economic conditions within which Islamic religion and culture operate. 
 
Marxists and other related structuralists have also mounted a critical response to 
classical demographic transition theory. In the main,  it is argued that this 
'constructed view of social change' that defines classical transition theory,  does not 
take into consideration the dymanic, changeable and at times, rather uneven nature 
of social change. It is argued that the scio-economic changes brought about by the 
move from the domestic mode of production to wage earning and market economies 
are variable, affecting different groups wthin populations in different ways.  
Furthermore, it is argued that, while developing countries are incorporated into the 
world market economy, different 'modes of production' can continue to co-exist, with 
the domestic mode and household units continuing to be important as units 
deploying members in the subsistence economy and in the market economy through 
migration . Consequently, family demographic strategies continue to be committed to 
high fertility 10. It is also argued that the move from self-subsistence to market 
economy and wage earning bring about specific circumstances and insecurity that 
favor a burst of natality as a means of social security and the survival of the younger 
generation and, hence, the accentuation of the demographic effects o famine or 
unemployment11 Thus the transition model lends itself to viewing fertility transition as 
one integral part of the overall transition from traditional to modern society as a 
single dimensional process from high fertility to low fertility, a problematic of the 
model that has been critisized by non-marxists as well as being  misleading to policy 
makers as well as the public12 and , in fact, an inaccurate representation of reality. 
Examining the African experience, for instance, we note that fertility levels continued 
to be maintained at much higher levels than other regions13, despite the introduction 
of the capitalist mode of production. However, such an introduction evolved along 
with ' the violent and discontinuous character of social change associated with the 
importation of capitalist production', and rendering such a transition incompatible 
with the theory of demographic modernization14. In effect, even in the case of 
                                                          
10Piche, V.: The Economic System and the Demographic System: Where Are 
We Today?, Population, Reproduction, Societes: Perspectives et Enjeux de 
Demographie Sociale, Edited by Cordell, D. et al, Montreal, Canada, 1993, pp.13-
18. 
11 Meillasoux, C., The Economic Bases of Demographic Reproduction : From 
the Domestic Mode of Production to Wage-Earning, Journal of Peasant Studies, 
(11)1, C1983, pp.50-61. 
12NG, SM, GU, B., Dimensions of Fertility Transition in the Third World: Level, 
Timing and Quality, unpublished presentation at the Annual Meeting of the 
Population Association of America, San Francisco, (2)26, April 6-8. 1995 
13Engelhard, P., An End to Poverty, Vivre Autrement, 10-1 October, 1994. 
14 Cordell, D. et al (editors), Population, Reproduction, Societes: 
Perspectives et Enjeux de Demographie Sociale, Montreal, Canada, 1993, pp.13-
18. 
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today's  industrial countries, the process of fertility decline took different time trends, 
with France taking 107 years in the process of decline of natural growth to a minimal 
level, while Japan taking only 10 years, and England 20 years15  because of the 
different nature of the socio-economic, historic geographic  and political conditions 
within which this fertility change took place.. Threre is epirical evidence on the 
origins,speed and correlates of fertility declines in different historical and 
geographical settings that point to the existence of more diversity than a theory of 
fertility change cna predict16. 
 
                                                          
15Miljanic,M., Demographic Transition Theory: Theory or Model, 
Stanovnistvo, 30-31, 1992, pp.5-20. 
16 Hirschman, C., Why Fertility Changes, Annual Review of Sociology, 20, 
1994, pp.203-233. 
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While this framework is useful in explaining the limitations of the notion of 
modernization, and in exposing the at time dramatically disastrous economic effects 
of the incorporation of developing nations into the world market and the impact of 
this incorporation in bringing about or intensifying poverty, famine and even 
upheaval, its limitation lies in an over-emphasis on economic/ production factors that 
do not adequately deal with patriarchal, status, cultural, idelological  and state 
policy/interventions influences that can have an important impact on fertility and 
fertility behavior. For instance, it has been argued that high fertility augments the 
political and social power of tribes in Iran, where children were found to be perceived 
in terms of their strong social power17 - a notion that is not so different from the 
Palestinian notion of 'Izweh or clan socio/political and protective strength and 
support.  Likewise, it has also been shown that family planning programme efforts, 
especially if supported by strong governmental population policies and specific 
interventions in that area, can contribute to a decline in fertility in important ways, 
despite other seemingly over-riding factors 18. Moreover, although socio-economic 
factors affect reproductive behavior, they can can also have an impact in terms of 
their reinforcement of certain cultural values19, including, for instance,  the 
preference for male children exibhited by many developing societies20. 
 
                                                          
17Agha janian, A., The Value of Children and Fertility in Iran; A Pilot Study 
(unpublished), 1986. 
18 Nagi, M.H. and Stockwell, E.G., Muslim Fertility: Recent Trends and Future 
Outlook, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 6(2), 1982, pp.48-
70. 
19 Okediji, F.O., Changes in Individual Reproductive Behavior and Cultural 
Values, IUSSP Lecture Series on Population, Liege, International Union for the 
Scientific Study of Population, 1974. 
20 Immerwahr, G.E., Socio-economic: How much Economic and How Much 
"Socio'?, the Economic and Social Support of High Fertility: Proceedings of the 
Conference Held in Canberra, 16-18 November, 1976, edited by Ruzicka, L.T., 
Australian National University, Department of Demography and Development 
Studies Centre, 1977, pp.187-201; Galal-El-Din, M.E., The Rationality of High 
Fertility in Sudan, in Caldwell, J.C.(ed), The Persistence of High Fertility: 
Population Prospects in the Third World, Vol.1, Pt.2, Australian National 
University, Canberra, Australia, 1977 pp.633-658. 
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One of the principal arguments linking high fertility levels to gender inqualities rests 
on the premise that legal, economic, educational and health  inequalities faced by 
women in the developing world come in the way of their passage in the transition 
from high to low fertility status. Feminists have contributed to the debate on fertility 
and fertility determinants  by arguing that an important component of patriarchy is 
forms of social control over women's reproductive capacity21, leaving women with 
little direct control over the timing and number of their children, the circumstances 
under which they work, the returns to their labour and their sexuality22.  
 
Feminists generally hold that,  one of the important factors in modern fertility decline 
is the changing economic conditions and employment opportunities outside the 
household that conflict with childbearing coupled with women's increasing access to 
material resources independent of men and children23 . However, this interaction 
between fertility decline and women's work outside the household is described as 
strong in some countries, and weak in others. Here, it is argued that ' women's work 
can occur under two opposing conditions: pressure to work to support a large family 
and pressure to limit children in order to work and eliminate the potential for role 
conflicts'.  Thus increased fertility may in fact force women to work to meet rising 
household consumption demands. That is, different types of relationships between 
work and feritliyt exist, with differing results - increase, decrease or no change in 
fertility, depending on the context of the household unit, and the history of events 
shaping fertility decisions.  
 
                                                          
21 Folbre, N., Of Patriarchy Born: The Political Economy of Fertility Decisions, 
Feminist Studies, 9(2), 1983, pp.261-284. 
22Dixon Mueller, R., Patriarchy, Fertility and Women's Work in Rural 
Societies, International Population Conference/Congres International de la 
Population, New Delhi, September 20-27 ,1989, Vol 2, Liege, Belgium, 
International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, 1989, pp.291-303. 
23 Iverson, S, Evolutionary Demographic Transition Theory: comparative 
Causes of Prehistoric, Historic and modern Demographic Transitions, Doctoral 
Dissertation, Unversity of Florida, 1992; Felmlee, D.H., The Dynamic 
Interpdependence of Women's Employment and Fertility, Social Science 
Research, 22,4, 1993, pp.333-360; Jeevan, S., Employment of Women as Related 
to Fertility Decline, Population Education News, Jul.Sep. 1993, pp.22-23. 
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In line with the notion that women's work outside the household is not always linearly 
and positively associated with decreased fertility, and where consequently,  women's 
work outside the home is not always incompatible with her primary role as a 
biological reproducer,  researchers have emphasized the importance  of the costs 
and benefits of children as an economic resource. It is argued that in industrial 
countries, the transition from high to low fertility encompassed a rising cost and 
falling benefits to parents of having many children24. However, within this view that 
visualizes children in terms of their economic or non-economic value for parents and 
households, it is also argued that the cost of rearing and educating children is 
insignificant in terms of the existing resources in the family25 that the costs of feritliy 
are primarily deferrred to women in the patriarchal system, with men maintaining a 
low cost to fatherhood. Moreover,  extended families provide security which comes 
from maximum reproduction26, while  extended family support networks can be 
important factors sustaining high fertility, reducing the costs of fertility for women, 
thereby helping them to sustain their roles and responsibilities as biological pro-
creators and sustain employment at the same time. That is, the labor force 
participation of women in some countries is not in competition with fertility because 
fertility is facilitated by access to kin27.  
 
                                                          
24McGreevey, WP, Economic Aspects of Historical Demographic Change, 
World Bank, Staff Working Paper No.685, Washington D.C., 1985. 
25 Gala El Din, M.E., The Rationality of High Fertility in Urban Sudan, in 
Caldwell, J.C. (ed.) The Persistence of High Fertility: Population Prospects in the 
Third World, Vol.1 Pt.2,  Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, 1977, 
pp.633-658. 
26 Caldwell, P., Egypt and the Arabic and Islamic Worlds, in Caldwell, J.C. 
(ed), The persistence of High Fertility : Population Prospects in the third 
World, Vol.1, Pt.2, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, 1977, 
pp.593-616. 
27 See for instance, Garey, A.L., and Townsend, N., Sharing the Costs of 
High Fertiltiy : Kin Support and Child Care in a Village in Bostwana, 
Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Miami, 
Florida, May 5-7, 1994; 
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A similar line of argument can be found in discussions of the relationship between 
fertility and women's education/ age at first marriage. It has been shown  that  the 
education of women is a key determinant of family size and that, as women's 
education rises, fertility rates decline. That is education is found to be the main 
predictor of variation in fertility, with age at marriage rising with increasing education 
and consequently reducing period fertility rates28. However, it has also been found 
that the relationship between fertility and education is complex, and not always uni-
directional, with conflicting evidence in the literature showing how increasing 
education alone is not sufficient in itself to produce changes in fertility, as was noted 
for the Gaza Strip for instance, and where access to employment opportunities was 
believed to be a key determinant of fertility changes.29 Moreover, It has also been 
noted in different parts of the world that women with the least education in fact can 
experience most rapid fertility decline and increase in contraceptive usage30. In other 
words, while the increasing education of women appears to be a factor contributing 
to fertility declines, it also appears to operate not on its own, but concommitant with 
other influences related to the economic setting and the availability of work 
opportunities as well as family planning services. 
 
                                                          
28 Cleland, J. and Rodrigues,G., How Women's Work and Education affect 
Family Size, People, 7(4), 1980, pp.17-18; Sujatha, DS, Murthy, MS, Husband-Wife 
Communication and Fertility among two seectos of Brahmin, Journal of Family 
Welfare, 39(4) 1993, pp.26-30. 
29Fargues, P., Changing Hierarchies of Gender and Generation, in Makhlouf 
Obermeyer, C.(ed) Family, Gender and Population in the Middle East, Policies in 
Context, American University in Cairo Press, 1995, p.185. 
30 Weinberger, M. et al, Women's Education and Fertility : A Decade of 
Change in Four Latin American Countries, International Family Planning 
Perspectives, 15(1), 1989, pp.4-14. 
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Feminists  contend  that population policies and international interest in fertility are 
linked to national and international goals of fertility reduction and the control of 
population growth, focusing mainly on the delivery of modern contraceptives and 
sterilizaion as the main way of achieving fertility reduction rather than viewing the 
fertility porblem from  the perspective of women's rights and needs31.  Feminists 
challenge the premise that population planning equals family planning equals fertility 
control32. Feminists from the developing world also argue that population control 
policies are constructer to furthe the interest of First World countries and function in 
the patriarchal social situation, oppress women while denying them choices to 
propmote their health, and that whether antinatalist or pronatalist, population policies 
tend to treat women's bodies as instruments of male-dominated populationist ends 
33They stress that reproductive rights  are at the core of the population problem, 
where gender equality is seen as the cause, not the consequence of economic 
growth and smaller families34. They also call for the transformation of population 
policies to address development and human rights concerns and transform family 
planning into reproductive and sexual health servicees that advance health and 
rights35. The struggle to achieve women's reproductive rights is generally seen as a 
fight against patriarchy, basic beliefs, and legal systems at all levels36. 
 
In summary, then, attempts to come to grips with the issues of fertility, fertility 
decline and demographic changes are hampered by international controversies and 
contending veiws that preclude the possibilities of making definitive statements 
                                                          
31  Sen, Gita et al (eds) Population Policies Reconsidered, Health 
Empowerment and Rights,  Harvard Center for Population and Development 
Studies and International Women's Health Coalition,  Harvard University press, 
1994; Zurayk et al., Rethinking Family Planning Policy in Light of Reproductive 
Health Research, The Policy series in Reproductive Health No.1, The Population 
Council Regional Office for West Asia and North Africa, Cairo, 1994. 
32 Mumtaz, K., the Woman Not the Womb : Population Policy in Pakistan, 
Development, 1, 1994, pp.26-30. 
33Karkal, M., Family Planning and Reproductive Health, Indian Journal of 
Social Work, 54(2), 1993, pp.297-306. 
34 McCormak, T., Feminism and Fertility, Queen's Quarterly, 92(2), 1985, 
pp.251-259. 
35 Lane, S.D., From Population Control to Reproductive Health: An Emerging 
Policy Agenda, Social Science and Medicine, 39(9), 1994, pp.1303-1314; 
Germain, A. et al.,  Setting a New Agenda, Sexual and Reproductive Health and 
Rights, Environment and Urbanization, 6(2), 1994, pp.133-154; Handwerker, W., 
West Indian Gender Relations, Family Planning Programs and Fertility Decline, 
Social Science and Medicine, 35(10), 1992, pp.1245-1257. 
36 Cook, R., Putting the 'Universal" into human rights. Reproductive Health 
and International Law, Populi, 21(7), 1994, pp.15-16. 
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regarding the way in which to approach  Palestinian demography and fertility. What 
can be safely stated here is what has been stated by others before, namely that  
complexities and diversity preclude the possibility of a dopting a simple theory of 
fertility change. Indeed, the complexity and instability of the Palestinian context 
prescribe a cautious approach to our reading of demography and fertility that is 
partially  located in highlighting  the differing socio-economic realities of the different 
regions of the country, and of men, women and families, while emphasizing the 
notion of Palestinian women's rights. It is guided by the same  observation that 
others have noted, namely that 'peasants' and people, including the Palestinians - 
are not stupid and that they are economically rational. That is, while family decisions 
regarding family size cannot be reduced to cost benefit considerations, such 
decisions are affected in the long run by economic constraints. 
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Palestinian Population Trends 
 
Historically, displacement and migration in search of work opportunities abroad have 
had fundamental effects on Palestinian population trends in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. Both the 1948 and the 1967 Arab Israeli wars led to substantial shifts of 
population, with refugees moving into and expelled out of these areas as a result of 
of Israeli  military agression and war.  By the late 1970's, only about 25% of the 
Palestinian population was living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip37,  under Israeli 
military rule. During the years of military occupation, major changes to the 
economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were brought about, with some 
benefits - mostly in the form of rising individual incomes - and many burdens - 
economic dependence, distortion and stagnation38. Migration into Israel and to the 
Arab world in search of work opportunities, especially after the mid 1970's was an 
important factor contributing to a decline of the population of the area and the 
decrease in population growth noted for the 1970's and early 1980's. Such changes 
in the population took place then as a result of Israeli policy aimed at intensifying the 
pressures upon Palestinian residents with tha aim of ultimately depopulating the 
area. Thus  massive expulsions and emigration offset the natural increase in the 
population, which averaged a high of 3.5 percent per year, and minimized the effects 
on total population growth. The structure of the population was consequently 
distorted by selective expulsion and emigration of young adult males, where, in the 
middle years of life, the absence of males was particularly noticeable39.  However, 
and despite these factors, the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip grew to 
almost double its 1967 size by the early 1990's40. 
                                                          
37 Hill, A., The Palestinian Population of the Middle East, Population and 
Development Review, 9(2), 1983, p.295. 
38 See for instance, Van Arkadie, B., Benefits and Burdens: A Report on the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip Economies Since 1967, Carnegie Endowment for  
International Peace, New York, 1977; Graham-Brown, S., The Economic 
Consequencies of the Occupation, in  Aruri, N. (ed), Occupation Israel Over 
Palestine, Second Edition, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 
Belmont, Mass., 1989, pp. 297-360. 
39 Abu Lughod, J.L., The Demographic Consequences of the Occupation, in 
Aruri, N.... Occupation..., ibid, p.406. 
40 Sabella, B., The Population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with 
Reference to the Palestinian Population of 1948, Palestinian Population and 
Family Planning Conference, Cairo, March/April 1994, , Palestinian Family 
Planning and Protection Society and Palestinian Red Crescent Soceity, Part Two, p 
71. 
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During the years of occupation, Palestinian demography and fertility assumed 
special importance to both Palestinians and Israelis. From the Israeli point of view, 
the demographic question, that is, the natural and rapid increase in Palestinian 
family size, presented a real danger in undermining a jewish majority in the area's 
population. From the Palestinian point of view, Palestinian Arab population growth 
was seen as a prime instrument of change and Palestinian victory in the Palestinian 
national struggle for survival41. Consequently, calls and concrete steps were made to 
improve the health care infrastructure in the occupied areas, with a focus on 
developing maternal and child health services geared towards encouraging and 
supporting women to have as many children as possible. That is, within this 
generalized framework, women were seen as an object/ instrument that men use in 
the national struggle, without regard to women's needs,  health status - because the 
children were the primary focus of the health service provision network -  or rights, 
nor to the socio-economic changes taking place in the area that dictated a different 
role for women in society and in politics.  However, and as has been shown, despite 
national ideologies and fervor calling on Palestinian to increase their family sizes as 
a matter of national survival,  and perhaps not as rapidly and consistently  as 
classical demographic theory would have predicted,  fertility in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip has in fact declined over the years. 
 
 
Trends and Characteristics 
 
Mortality since 1967 
 
In general terms, mortality in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 1967 has taken a 
downward trend, with the  steady decline in infant mortality rates being the most 
important factor contributing to the overall decline in mortality.  It has been estimated 
that the infant mortality rate in the area was in the order of 130 deaths/1000 live 
births  in the early 1970's42. Throughout the seventies, the downdwards trend in 
mortality observed in the 1960's continued,  where by the early and up to the middle 
1980's infant mortality was estimated to be between 50-80 deaths/1000 live births43, 
depending on the region, and reaching an all time low of about  43 deaths/1000 live 
births for the West Bank and by the late 1980's44.  
                                                          
41 Tamari, S. and Scott... op.cit. 
42 Hill, A., op.cit. p. 303-305. 
43  The Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, An Overview of Health Conditions and Services in The Israeli Occupied 
Territories, Jerusalem, August, l987. 
44 Abu Libdeh et al, Population Characeristics and Trends, in Heiberg , M. 
and Ovensen, G. (ed) Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank and Arab 
Jerusalem, A Survey of Living Conditions, Fafo Report 151, 1993 p.69; Abu 
Libdeh H. et al, A Survey of Infant and Child Mortality in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, UNICEF and Jerusalem Family Planning and Protection Association, 1992. 
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It should be noted here that the reduction in infant mortality - the main element 
contributing to a general reduction in mortality among the population  and the main 
indicator of the health and well being of a nation -  took place despite occupation 
and not because of it and is probably largely due to two factors. The first relates to  
the economic changes taking place during this period. In general terms, the years of 
occupation reduced the area into a situation of dependence on the Israeli economy, 
as well as other aspects of life. A move away from agriculture as a major source of 
income took place, but it was not accompanied by a drift of the rural population to 
the cities, nor by the development of a fully capitalist commercial agriculture 45, 
Palestinians quickly became Israel's 'reserve army of labour', and unemployment 
went down to a minimum during much of the period. As a result, individual icnomes 
rose, contributing to better nutrition, healthier lives, and, consequently, a reduction in 
infant mortality. The second factor relates to the development of a health care 
infrastructure by Palestinians for Palestinians outside the control of the Israeli 
military and within the framework of a non-governmental organization movement. 
beginning immediately after 1967, and taking force in the late 1970's and 1980's. 
Palestinian national political as well as other groups, supported mostly by 
international aid agencies and charities, developed a network of clinics and health 
care services specifically oriented towards fulfilling people's basic health needs, 
especially in the deprived rural areas - where the mortality levels where highest. This 
movement succeeded in the delivery of  needed services to the population, and 
probably contributed in real ways to the observed reduction in mortality46. 
 
The second point that needs to be addressed here is that mortality declines affected 
different regions and different categories within the population in different ways. For 
instance, refugees, who had access to UNRWA health, educational and social 
services - including food distribution schemes -  had lower infant mortality rates than 
the rest of the population, especially during the 1980's47 .  During the 1980's, the 
central region of the West Bank and urban areas in general had lower infant 
mortality rates than the north and the South of the West Bank, and especially  rural 
and remote communities, where infant mortality continued to be quite high, reaching  
                                                          
45 Graham Brown, S. ' The Economic Consequences of Occupation, in Aruri, 
op.cit. p.191. 
46 See the Health Chapter for further details. 
47 Abu Libdeh, op.cit. 
 
 15 
97 deaths/1000 live births in 1988 for 20 villages in the Hebron District, in contrast to 
49 deaths/1000 live births in a central area communityfor 198648. These regional in 
mortality no doubt had an impact on the population's characteristics. However, the 
dearth of information precludes the possibility of examining such differences and 
their impact on population structure in the area. 
 
A gender difference in infant mortality, in favor of boys, was also observable in both 
community and national level studies whereby boys were shown to have a better 
chance of survival than girls, primarily because of social disadvantage of   
females  49.  Disparities between boys and girls, unfortunately, extend to morbidiltiy 
as well - the incidence of disease - where, as it will be shown in the health chapter, 
girls in the Palestinian society of the 1970's and 1980's as well as now, continue to 
be at higher risk of disease and death than boys of the same age and socio-
economic status category.  It is important to point out here that, for biological 
reasons relating to the inherent 'weakness' of the male y chromosome relative to the 
x chromosome of females, more male children tend to die during the first year of life 
than females. This means that, in a population where social determinants are not 
operating, one would expect to see more male children dying than felames during 
the first year of life. However, in West Bank and Gaza societies, the opposite of what 
is biologically predicted has taken and continues to  take place, with more girls dying 
than boys, and where social determinants - the oppression and low status afforded 
to women in this society - have overriden biological predisposition. In other words, a 
gender informed reading of one of the main determinants of population growth - 
infant mortality and child survival - points to the need of addressing the question of 
regional and gender inequalities in future population policy delineations. 
 
Fertility since 1967 
 
                                                          
48 The Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees and Birzeit University 
Community Health Unit, The Biddu Health Study Interim Report, Jerusalem, 1986. 
49 See for instance, Giacaman, R., Life and Health In Three Palestinian 
Villages, Ithaca Press, London, 1988; Abu Libdeh.... op.cit. 
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Even in the 1960's, the area was known to have high fertility rates. For instance, it 
has been estimated that the average parity for West Bank women aged 45-49 in 
1971 was 7.5, a figure close to the total fertitlity obtained for the area during that 
period. It appears that after 1967 and up to 1976, there has been no change in the 
fertility rates in either the West Bank or the Gaza Strip50 . However, fertility levels 
began to decline gradually since the middle 1970's and up till the middle 1980's, 
affecting women of different age groups in different ways. For instance, In the West 
Bank the decline affected mostly women betwen the ages of 15-25, while in Gaza, it 
affected women under the age of 20. This reduction in fertility was especially evident 
among women with better education, indicating a possible role of education in the 
reduction of fertility, and linking a higher age at first marriage for educated women 
the rest of the women population51. By the early 1990's, it was estimated that the 
Total Fertility Rate for the West Bank and Gaza Strip was 6.84 births per woman - 
with a higher fertility rate for the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank, and  with 
the exception of the period of the Uprising, where it is postulated that fertility has 
risen slightly because of the a believed rise in early marriages and a general 
tendency among the population to have more children52. 
 
Given available information, it is clear that Palestinian fertiltiy has been taking a 
declining trend, although perhaps not sufficiently rapidly to thwart a very rapid 
population growth.  Several factors probably contribute to this slowly declining trend, 
where some determinants are offsetting the impact of others. For instance,in the 
Gaza urban environment,  although women's education has rapidly risen over the 
years, this was not accompanied by the expected level of reduction in fertility, and 
despite the economic hardship that the area has been facing in its recent history that 
should theoretically prompt people to have less children. However, and as has been 
noted, part of the explanation for this un-expected pattern - continued high fertility 
with the rapid rise in the educational levels of women - is attributed to the absence of 
a concommitant rise in women's status and job opportunity imposed by the political 
and economic reality in the area53. That is, the job market locally has been limited 
for women - or not cost effective, and mostly closed for work in Israel. As a result, 
educated women continue to mostly remain at home, without having to face the 
fertility- cost/benefit of rearing children dilemma and the potential incompatibiltiy 
between the primary role of women as biological reproducers and work outside the 
home. Moreover, within this predominantly patriarchal society, the costs of feritliy are 
primarily deferrred to women, with men maintaining a low cost to fatherhood. For, 
even among women who do work outside the home in formal employment - about 
                                                          
50 Hill, A. The Palestinian...op.cit. 
51 Tamari and Scott, op.cit. 
52 Abu Libdeh, op.cit. 
53 Fargues, P., Changing Hierarchies of Gender and Generation in the Arab 
World, in Makhlouf Obermeyer, C. (ed) Family, Gender and Population in the 
Middle East, Policies in Context,  the American University In Cairo Press, 1995, 
pp.179-198. 
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19% in the West Bank and a very low of 6% in the Gaza Strip in the early 1990's54, 
within the Palestinian context, and given the importance of the family as a system of 
socio-economic support,  extended family support networks that are mostly based 
on women's unpaid labour - mothers, grandmothers, mother in laws and sisters - are 
probably important factors sustaining higher than expected  fertility, reducing the 
costs of fertility  and, thereby helping women to sustain their roles and 
responsibilities as biological pro-creators and sustain employment at the same time. 
 
                                                          
54 Heiberg and Ovensen, op.cit., p.388. 
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Secondly, given the prevailing general  economic and political insecurity felt at the 
individual family and national levels, an important influence on fertility remains the 
value of children as a source of income and as a means to ensure old age 
security55.  It has been rightly argued that a reduction in fertiltiy levels will be 
influenced by the development of public social security systems that can guarantee 
easy acccess to health and educational facilities and that can ensure security in old 
age. Given the Palestinian circumstances during the past 30 years, it is quite 
understandable why fertility rates did not decline as rapidly as expected, and despite 
the specific socio-economic changes taking place in the area. 
 
Lastly, while infant mortality rates have been rapidly declining, they nevertheless 
continue to be high, especially in the rural areas of the north and the south of the 
West Bank.  Infant death is a phenomenon that has an important impact on the 
family and collective consciousness. With an infant mortality rate of about 40 
deaths/1000 live births in the area during the early 1990's, Palestinian families 
continued to face the experience of child death, and conseuqently the need to 
increase their family sizes in order to compensate for the loss, or the potential loss, 
of their children, especially if the loss is that of a male child. 
 
Family planning services 
 
Historically, family planning service provision took root in the area in the 1970's and 
early 1980's. 
 
 
Current Population Characteristics 
 
Since 1967 and up till 1995, all Palestinian population data were derived out of the 
1967 Israeli census and its population projections for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
or represented estimates of population drawn up utilizing different methodologies but 
without referring to an actual survey represeting all of the population of the area. 
Today, and for the first time since 1967, we are able to examine the principal 
features of the Palestinian population's demographic picture by referring to the 
recently published demographic sample survey  covering about 14000 
representative dwelling units/ or households, and conducted by the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of statistics and referring to the year 1995. 
 
Age and Sex 
 
The Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is characterized by 
being rather young, with 46.9% of the population found to be under the age of 15 
years. The differences between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are evident, 
where in the Gaza Strip 50.3% of the total population are under the age of 15 years, 
in contrast to a lower 45% in the West Bank.  Likewise, the population under the age 
of 30 years is also very  high, with a total of 74.3% of the population - 73.4% for the 
                                                          
55 Tamari, S. and Scott, A., op.cit. 
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West Bank and an astronomical 76.1% for the Gaza Strip - being in this age 
category. These results and the differences between the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank are a reflection of the combined effects of two determinants of population 
growth: the higher fertility rates, and the slightly higher chances of child survival - or 
lower infant and childhood mortality - in the Gaza Strip relative to the West Bank.  
 
 20 
 
Males under the age of 15 years constituted 47.5% of the total male population, 
while females constitued a lower 46.3% of the female population for the same age 
category. A closer examination of the data reveals that the differences in 
percentages of males and females under 15 years of age is strongest in the early 
years, with 18.7% of the total female population being 0-4 years old, in contrast to 
19.3 among the boys, and  gradually declines at ages 5-9 years and reaching 12.9% 
of the total male population for males, in contrast to 12.7% of the total female 
population for females. 10-14 years. These results suggest continued differences 
betwen the sexes in infant and child mortality rates, in favor of boys. The same 
pattern of differences between the sexes is observed for the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip separately, although interestingly, the differences between the sexes are less 
dramatic in Gaza compared to the West Bank: we find that 50.7% of the males are 
under 15 years old in contrast to to 50% for females in Gaza, while 45.8% of the 
males are under 15 years old compared to a lower 44.2% for females in the West 
Bank. These results indicate that the chances of child survival in the Gaza Strip are 
higher than in the West Bank. But they also suggest that when the chances of 
survival are higher, they positively influence the survival of females. Conversly, when 
the chances of child survival are low, girls are more negatively affected than boys. 
 
We note a reversal in patterns related to sex in the age categories 30--69, where we 
find that when 23.6% of the population is within this age category, men constitute 
22.3% of the male population while women constitute 25.3% of the female 
population. The patterns are similar in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, although 
the differences are sharper in the West Bank, with 22.7% of the male population 
falling in this age category relative to a high of 26.3% for females, in contrast to 
21.4% of males in Gaza in this age category, relative to 23.3% for females. That is, 
women outnumber the men in these age groups. This is probably a reflection of the 
outmigration/expulsion of men from the areas. What is interesting to observe is that 
this reversal of pattern - where males constitute a higher percentage of the male 
population relative to women - begins to be noted early in the West Bank, starting 
with ages 30-34, and takes place considerably later in the Gaza Strip, starting with 
ages 45-49, and in less pronounced ways than in the West Bank. Perhaps this is a 
reflection of the inability of the younger Gazans to exit the country, and the relatively 
higher ability and networks of West Bankers  - via Jordan - to continue to seek 
employment, education and a better life abroad. 
 
Reversal once again begins to takes place in early old age, with a  pattern of 
declining percetanges of females relative to males, and where we find that 1.9% of 
the women's population is 70 years or older in contrast to 2% for men. Arguably, the 
differences in percentages are tiny, but what we should take into consideration here 
is that the average life expectancy for women is higher than men in most developed 
societies. That is, even if the percentages of males and females who are older are 
the same, the point continues to hold: women should live longer because of 
biological reasons related to their relative strength compared to men. Consequently 
these results suggest that  the life and health conditions of women, leading to 
premature death, is worse than that of men, and is a reflection of the debased and 
unequal status of women in Palestinian society. Overall, a low of 3.4% of the total 
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population is 65 years or older, with 2.9% for the Gaza Strip and a higher 3.7% for 
the West Bank. These data reflect  continued inadequate socio-economic, nutritional 
and health conditions in the area , affecting especially the Gaza Strip population. 
 
Mortality 
 
The PCBS survey dealt with infant and child mortality only, and not total mortality. 
The figures on infant and child mortality were obtained using different methods that 
those used in previous infant and child mortality studies in the area ( previous 
studies used indirect techniques while the PCBS ones used direct ones). 
Consequently, it is very difficult to make the relevant comparisons and delineate time 
trends that are continuous through the present. A few words are in order here, 
however. Firstly, the results obtained from the PCBS survey indicate that the infant 
mortality rate for the the most recent period ( or up to five years preceeding the 
survey) is 28 deaths per/1000 live births, a figure that strikes any health care 
provider as too low to reflect reality. Moreover, the Fafo survey indicates that for 
1990, the infant mortality rate was 48 deaths/1000 live births. Unicef's and other 
studies, utilizing indirect estimates as well - as with FAFO, corroborate FAFO's 
results. Thus, even if estimates are obtained with different methods, it is highly 
unlikely that the results would be so disparate. Secondly, it is well known that as 
infant mortality rapidly declines, such declines do not and cannot continue their 
trends as rapidly because further reductions  in infant mortality require much bigger 
efforts and changes not only within the health care system, but the different systems 
affecting health, such as the safety of the environment, employment, nutrition and 
other such important determinants of health. In contrast to the figure obtained by the 
PCBS survey, there are reasonable iindications that, at best, infant mortality declines 
have reached a platau during the past 4-5 years, and, at worst, that this decline is 
taking a turn with an upward trend and rise in infant mortaltiy. It should be 
remembered that since the early 1990's a substantial proportion of non-
governmental organization health care services, especially the rural clinics, have 
closed down56. Moreover, a 1995 survey of children's nutritional status in the Gaza 
Strip indicates that 15.1% of the sample children under the age of 5 years were 
moderately and severely malnourished - or below 2 standard deviations of the 
reference weight for age . The same study also found that about 14.2% of the 
children were stunted - evidence of long term or chronic malnutrition57. These results 
generally indicate a significant and higher than expected rate of malnutrition among 
children in the Strip, and raise questions as to the impact of such malnutrition on 
overall child mortality. In other words, it is hard to believe that infant mortality would 
have declined dramatically in the first part of the 1990's to reach the levels indicated 
by the PCBS study. In the meanwhile, economic hardship is in fact on the rise in the 
area, and unemployment is reaching high levels. Given this economic hardship and 
                                                          
56 At least 40% of the clinics operating mostly in the rural areas in the late 
1980's have since closed down. Information obtained from Health Development 
Information Project Data Base, Ramallah, 1995. 
57 Kumar, B., Assessment of the Nutritional Status of Children Under 5 in 
the Gaza Strip, Terres Des Hommes, Gaza Strip, December 1995. 
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a decline in service provision, it is highly unlikely that this downwards trend in 
mortality as reflected by the PCBS figures is in fact an accurate representation of 
reality.  
 
PCBS has also outlined figures for maternal mortality by age, generally reflecting 
gradual declines in maternal mortality over the years. Taking women who are 20 and 
up to 49 years old as part of our calculation, and taking into consideration an 
element of under-reporting, we find that these figures might reflect and overall 
maternal mortality of about 100/100,000. It is difficult to assess the accuracy of 
these figures, mainly because of complication faced in this country pertaining to the 
way in which the causes of death are reported, and because of the absence of other 
comparable studies. However, we estimate here that these figures do not represent 
a substantial departure from reality, and compare favorably with maternal mortality in 
developing countries - 290 for 1980-1987 in contrast to 24 for industrial ones 58. 
Consequently, it appears that, while maternal mortality is an important issue that 
needs to be addressed by health and population policy, it is not the most pressing 
one, in contrast to, for example, to the impact of high fertility on the health of women 
and their children in morbidility  and life quality terms. 
 
Fertility and Age at First Marriage. 
 
With a high and persistent Total Fertility Rate of 6.24 for the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip - compared to a rate of 3.8 for the developing world and 2 in the industrial world 
for 199159 - regional variations are evident. Firstly, the West Bank fertility rates are 
considerably lower than those of the Gaza Strip, with 5.61 TFR for the West Bank, in 
contrast to 7.44 for the Gaza Strip. Secondly, urban centres have the lowest fertility, 
with 5.81, followed by rural areas, with 6.39 and a high of 6.85 for refugee camps. 
Thirdly, PCBS data indicates a high -20% -rate of reported pregnancy at the time of 
the survey among all married women, with Gaza having the highest rate - 20.9% - 
followed by 18.5% for rural areas and a lower 17.8% for urban areas.  That is, while 
the overall fertility rates are high, fertility in the Palestinian context is evidently 
influenced and modified by the general socio-economic context within which people 
live in ways that appear to be consistent with observed patterns elwhere in the world. 
                                                          
58 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1993. 
59 Ibid. 
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There is evidence that increasing educational levels of women have a negative 
impact on fertility - that is decreasing fertility with increasing educational levels, with 
a TFR of 6.62 for women who have had less than a high school education, 
compared to 5.57 for those who have completed high school and 4.72 for those who 
have completed more than a high school education.  However, While the 
relationship of declining fertility with rising education is clearly there when one 
examines the overall figures for both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, we find that this 
relationship does not hold when examining each of the areas separately. PCBS's 
data indicate that women in the Gaza Strip are better educated than women in the 
West Bank for all age groups. However, the TFR for Gaza is considerably higher 
than in the West Bank. Clearly, the data from Gaza reflects mostly the fertility rates 
of refugee populations, who live in considerably different socio-economic conditions 
 to those of the West Bank. 
 
One factor that could possibly explain the difference relates to the access of women 
to employment outside the home. It has been argued that increasing the education 
of women and economic distress do not necessarily produce the expected effects - 
declining fertility - in situations of belligerence, producing massive unemployment, 
and consequently, the inaccessibility of women to paid work outside the home60. An 
examination fo the relationship of women's work to fertility however is not possible, 
because the absence of such important data from the PCBS report.  Another point 
argued by the same author pertains to the cost of children being upheld by UNRWA 
and international aid agencies, inadvertantly contributing to the persistent high 
fertility. While it may be true that refugees are partially sustained by such services, 
this argument seems too mechanistic and does not incorporate the meaning and 
importance of children for parent's later life. Indeed, people in this country actually 
spell this dependent relationship out. In conditions of great political and economic 
insecurity, such as the present reality in the Gaza Strip,  children function in lieu of 
the welfare state, not merely in economic terms, but also in social status terms as 
well as during conflict as potential power. Furthermore, up till recently, employment 
opportunities for Gaza males were in fact quite available, where one can argue that 
increasing family wealth relates to parents  having many male children in their 
families. It is only during the past two years or so that Palestinian migrant workers  
have faced serious impediments in seeking employment in Israel. Should these 
conditions continue, it is likely that this serious economic hardship will take time to 
reflect itself in fertility declines. Finally, it should be remembered that  family planning 
within the context health services must be readily available, accessible and 
affordable so that the impact of socio-economic changes on fertility declines 
becomes evident, which, until very recently, was not the case in neither the Gaza 
Strip nor the West Bank. 
                                                          
60Fargues, P., Changing Hierarchies... op.cit. 
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Another determinant of high fertility in the area is the age at which women first 
marry.  The Fafo study relating to the early 1990's shows that the median age at 
marriage was 19.5 years61. PCBS indicates a median age at first marriage of 20 
years for the middle 1990's, indicating basically no substantial change in the median 
age at first marriage for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Calculations obtained from 
the data presented by the PCBS report reveal that, generally speaking, marriage 
age appears to be rising, although the phenomenon of early as well as illegally early 
marriage continues. We find that for instance, while the FAFO survey indicated that 
in the early 1990's 37% of the women in the Gaza Strip married below the legal age 
of 17 years - Gaza follows the Egyptian codes, banning marriage under 17, while the 
West Bank follows the Jordanian laws, which bans marriages under the age of 15 - 
PCBS data indicates a lower 31% of Gaza women in fact married under the legal 
age of 17 years during 1995. For the West Bank, Fafo data reveal that 37% of 
women in the West Bank married before the age of 17 yars, and 11% before the 
legal age of 15 years. In contrast, calculations from the PCBS figures reveal that a 
declining figure of 30% of women in the West Bank married before the age of 17 
years and and about 6% below the legal age of 15 years mandated by Jordanian 
laws62. That is, marriage age does appear to be rising, although the phenomenon of 
early marriage continues to constitute an important proportion  of all marriage, and a 
danger to the health of women and children, in addition to a contributing factor 
partially explaining persistent high fertility in the area. Given the impact of the age of 
marriage on fertility, age of marriage becomes an important component of future 
Palestinian population policies. 
 
Desired Family Size 
 
                                                          
61 Hammami, Rema: Women in Palestinian Society, in Heigberg and 
Ovensen..... op.cit. pp. 283-311. 
62 We are unable to demonstrate regional variation in age of marriage- urban 
rural camp etc. - becaue the PCBS initial report did not contain such a data 
presentation. We have been recently told that PCBS will be publishing separate 
reports for each region alone in the near future. 
Utilizing PCBS tables pertaining to the responses of women to their views regarding 
the ideal number of children they would like to have, we find that, on the whole, 
about 63% of the  women reported that 4-6 children would be ideal. Women in Gaza 
seemed to prefer a larger number of children than those in the West Bank, with a 
high of 32% reporting 6 children as ideal in Gaza, in contrast to 24% in the West 
Bank, and 23% reporting 4 children as ideal in Gaza, in contrsat to 27% in the West 
Bank. The results pertaining to locale are similar in that 29% of urban women 
thought that 4 children was ideal, in contrast to 24% among rural women and 23% 
among camp dwellers, while 25% of urban women believed that 6 children was 
ideal, in contrast to 27% in rural areas and a high of 32% in camps. It therefore 
appears that women's perceptions of ideal family size are in fact compatible with the 
actual number of children that they have, and comparing with a total fertitliy rate of 
6.24 for the area. What gives further support to this argument is the finding that in 
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fact, very few women reported that they would have wanted less children than what 
they had at the time of the survey. PCBS data indicates that 65% of the women 
reported that there is agreement between them and their husbands on the desired 
number of children they should have while 35% reported no agreement or no 
discussion. Among those with husband agreement, only 8% reported that they would 
have wanted less children that what they had, in contrast to 7% among those who 
did not have an agreement with their husbands regarding their desired family size. 
That is, the data suggests that women's perceptions regarding family size is 
compatible with their practice. While the interpretation of these results should be 
approached with caution as they are rather tentative, one cannot help but raise the 
issue of Palestinian women's actual and ideal choice of family size ultimately 
corresponding to their interests, giventhe particularities of Palestinian socio-
economic and legal conditions that favor large family sizes, and that places women's 
vested interest in having large families, especially families of boys. Indeed, there are 
clear results in the PCBS study that point to boy preference among women. We find 
that, on the whole, calculations from the PCBS data reveal that an average of 3 boys 
is desired in the family, in contrast to 2 girls. 
 
Palestinian Population Policies: past experience and future options 
 
During the years of occupation, Palestinians were subjected to the contradictory 
effects of differing types of population policies, both stated and unstated. The first 
type exemplified the mainstream nationalist trend: a stated pronatalist policy utilizing 
population growth and the demographic pressure as an instrument through which to 
achieve liberation63.This policy also visualized women as an instrument of men's 
national politics and primarily placed women in the domain of biological reproduction 
and family sustenance. Such a policy did not merely remain in the domain of 
ideological sloganeering, but was concratized in the development of a very low costs 
- sometimes even free of charge - clinic infrastructure  that focused on what is called 
maternal and child health,  but in fact focusing on children's health and generally 
neglecting women's health needs. For instance, until recently, prenatal care focused 
on the pregnancy, while post-natal care - that is, the care specifically geared towards 
women - remained glaringly absent. Furthermore, such schemes consciously 
refrained from introducing family planning services within clinics even to safeguard 
women's and children's health. This policy was also translated into conscious efforts 
to encourage families and women to have children, and in sustaining and 
maintaining them through various means, including charity programmes developed 
by local charitable and women's socieites, political and religious groupings, all under 
the banner of steadfastness. Many groups, ironically  including women's 
committees, also focused on helping women to develop income generating schemes 
that do not contradict with their roles as wives and mothers - i.e. generating paid 
work for women in the homes in food production, sewing, knitting etc. An excellent 
example here is the work of In'ash al-'Usra, a women-s charitable society, which 
held a clearly stated pro-natalist nationalist policy of such excesses as to advertize 
special competitions for women who have more than ten children in local 
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newspapers, and which focused on helping women to financially and otherwise cope 
with large family sizes.  
 
Interestingly, although for completely different reasons, and primarily as a 
consequence of the neglect of the health care infrastructure, Israeli military 
government policy falls within the pro-natalist category. Through constraints on 
governmental health care budgets, inhibition of growth and general neglect, the 
governmental health care services failed to meet basic health needs, sustained 
minimal and very inadequate maternal and child health care services, and did not 
develop any family planning services throughout the years of occupation. Moreover, 
the violence exersised against individuals and the collectivity causing death, injury, 
disability and encouraging outmigration all fuelled the fire further, giving further 
credence and impetus to Palestinian pro-natalist positions and practices. 
 
The second type of policy evolved out of the health movement  that developed in the 
late 1970's and early 1980's. Beginning as a curative oriented scheme, some of 
these local health non-governmental organizations were gradually transformed with 
practice and experience and in the face of Palestinian health reality. By the middle 
1980's, and influenced largely by health considerations, some of these NGO's had 
already developed a new policy focusing on the need to re-consider the impact of 
high fertility on the well being of mothers and children . Such groups introduced 
family planning services within primary health care clinics, again at very low costs,   
and focused on the provision of adequate pre and post natal care. With practice, 
some of these groups developed further their policy, incorporating the notion of the 
right of couples to chose their ideal family size and the notion of the rights of women 
to health as part of their stated policy as well as practice64. In line with these 
changes in policy,  these groups  developed their programmes further, introducing 
women's health projects, and family planning services, as well as counselling, as 
core components of primary health care. 
 
                                                          
64 See, for instance, Najjab, S., Policy Statement of the Women's Health 
Programme at the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, Jerusalem, 
1994. 
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The third type of policy is that of UNRWA. While un-stated, UNRWA's population 
policy for refugees remained pro-natalist - perhaps inadvertantly - until very recently. 
Through its service provision history in the area, and until 2 years ago,  UNRWA 
provided basic medical and health care in the West Bank without any form of family 
planning services. In the Gaza Strip, family planning was restricted to 'advice' 
without the necessary availability and provision of family planning methods. It is 
believed that while UNRWA was aware of this problem, it was unable to react 
primarily because of the fear of a political reaction to such family planning service 
implementation, given the prevailing strong nationalistic pronatalist ideology. It is 
interesting to note here that, while this pronatalist nationalistic ideology did not stop 
the fertility rate to gradually decline throughout the period, it did contribute to the 
inhibition of the development of the family planning infrastructure in the area, which 
could very well have contributed to further declines in fertility. In that sense, it can be 
argued that the pro-natalist nationalist ideology probably had an impact, although 
indirect, on fertility levels in that it limited and constrained access to family planning 
services for those who wanted it. Other  factors also contributed to an in-advertant 
UNRWA pronatalist effect. Such factors include the observartion that one researcher 
put forth that UNRWA's basic services helped alleviate the costs of child rearing at 
the level of the household, thereby contributing to high fertility among refugees65 as 
well as UNRWA's stated and practiced policies regarding women.Up till the present, 
refugee women are not afforded equal status to refugee men by UNRWA 
mandate66, while UNRWA's health care services continue to subsume women's 
health care under the umbrella of family health, in an apparent refusal to afford 
women's health a status and importance of its own, and a continued focus on 
maternal and child health, although family planning is currently being introduced into 
the health care services. 
 
                                                          
65 Fargues in Makhlouf-Obermeyer (ed).. op.cit. 
66 Cervenac.....(what is the reference ?) 
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The fourth type of population policy is an anti-natalist/and or frank population control 
one, upheld mostly and recently by international aid agencies either operating or 
beginning to operate in the area67. While these different agencies couch their 
policies within the framework of women's reproductive health, safe motherhood,  or 
child spacing, the point of departure is the same: a problem of over-population in the 
area that requires immediate intervention, and where over-population is seen as  
leading to grave social inequities and resulting in a massive increase in the numbers 
of people living in poverty, in contrast the alternative view that views over-population 
as a consequence of poverty, inequality and insecurity68. The activities of such aid 
agencies in family planning project project implementation in the area is likely to 
considerably widen the family planning service network in the country, especially that 
most are developing projects in conjuction or close coordination with the Palestinian 
Authority, and consequently, will be or are implementing schemes within the 
governmental health care infrastructure. In this sense, the presence and activities of 
such agencies is likely to have a positive impact on women's choices and access to 
services that they need.  However, one can predict several problem areas here, 
based on the documented experiences of developing world women as well as based 
on the way in which such policies are being implemented. To begin with, while an 
anti-natalist population policy per se is not necessarily problematic in the absolute, it 
should not be implemented by international aid agencies without the adequate 
development of a Palestinian population policy that clearly spells out the national 
need for population control, and that takes into consideration the ways in which to 
minimize the differences in interest  - where one can see how as a nation, one 
needs to consider the issue of population growth given these severely constrained 
economic conditions, but at the same time, one can also see how individual family's 
 guarantee of economic security also rests on having as many children as possible - 
between individual families and the national collectivity. At the moment, while family 
planning programmes are beginnign to be implemented in conjuction with the PA 
and its blessing, this is being done without the requisite development of a 
comprehensive and well thought out national level population policy within which 
developments and programme implementation in the area could be guided.  Here, 
we are not suggesting that we have to wait until such policies are developed. Rather, 
there is a need for a great amount of care and restraint, especially in the area of 
introducing new contraceptive technologies, and in not exhausting scarce budgets 
on semi effective or possibly ineffective strategies.  Furthermore, the call here is for 
the development of a clear and comprehensive population policy that can guide 
these newly emerging activities in the area of fertility control. 
 
Seconldy, judging from what has been taking place in the developing world, much of 
the past's investment in population policy has focused on family planning programs 
                                                          
67 See, for instance, Wilson, A. New World Order and West's War on 
Population, Economic and Political Weekly, 29(34). 1994, pp.201-204. 
68 For an interesting version of this argument see, Meillasoux, C., The 
Economic Bases of Demographic Reproduction: From the Domestic Mode of 
Production to Wage Earnings, Journal of Peasant Studies, 11(1), 1983 pp.50-61. 
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without adequate attention being paid to other key issues69, such as women's status, 
early marriage, socio-economic development and social security. The fear in 
Palestine is precisely that such efforts, given the void of a comprehensive and 
rational Palestinian population policy, will translate into family planning services that 
are either ineffective or somewhat ineffective, and the expenditure of large amounts 
of scarse and much needed funds that could be more effectively used to address 
the population problem in more effective ways, and in synergysm - that is, using 
different types of strategies together to affect change geared towards the 
improvement of the quality of life of the individual, in contrast to achieving population 
control at the expense of individual and family welfare and rights. 
 
                                                          
69 See for instance, Sen, G. et al. (ed) Population Policies Reconsidered... 
op.cit. 
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Thirdly, given the generally laissez faire setting, where the PA is hardly able to deal 
with major political problems it is currently facing, and where generally speaking, 
international aid is left to its own devices suggesting and implementing different 
strategies, with the blessing of an Authority that is too over-burdened with other 
issues, and where we see  sometimes  one international aid policy contradicting the 
other, there is plenty of space for great maneuverability, including the introduction of 
potentially dangerous medications or medications that continue to face international 
controversy regarding safety70 without adequate consideration of the issues 
involved, such as injectable estrogens and progesterone - for instance, Depo-
Provera. 
 
That is, while there is no question that increasing the availability and accessibility of 
family planning is desireable both from the women's rights point of view as well as 
the national interest one, there is every indication to believe that the principal issues 
here are ones dealing with how these services are provided - for effectiveness and 
safety -  and given other measures going beyond the provision of family planning 
services that the Authority needs to use in order to effectively deal with the current 
population situation. 
 
Today, there is no doubt of the urgency of the need to develop a comprehensive and 
rational Palestinian Population Policy that can be at once effective and that can 
guarantee individual and women's rights. What then, are the principal issues that the 
Palestinian Authority needs to address in order to develop such a policy? 
 
 
Firstly, there is a need to recognize, based on international as well as Palestinian 
experience, that population policies should not be reduced to the introduction of 
family planning services, and that policies must also address people's concerns, 
insecurities and burdens. That is, such a policy needs to be developed in line with 
people's socio-economic reality. There is a need to emphasize here that political will 
and interventions from the part of the Authority are also very important and are likely 
                                                          
 
70 It is interesting to note that the literature regarding the safety of injectable 
contraceptives is full of controversy. However, generally speaking, those upholding 
safety have tested the use of these medications in developed settings, where patient 
information, consent and follow up is more or less guaranteed, while those 
upholding the notion of danger represent women's health and advocacy groups 
and/or have based their views on developing world experience, where patient 
consent, safety precautions, patient screening and adequate follow have not been 
guaranteed. See Francisco, J.S., Women's Reproductive Health Care: Research 
Notes, Institute for Social Studies and Action, Women and Health Booklet Series 
No. 5,  Qhezon City, Phillipines 1989; Hardon, A., Development of Contraceptives: 
General Concern. contraceptive ResaercH: Women's Perspective, in Mintzes, B. 
(ed.), A Question of Control. Women's Perspectives on the Development and 
Use of Contraceptive Technologies, Report of an International Conference 
Held in Woudschoten, the Netherlands, April, 1991, 1992, pp.7-16. 
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to have an impact on population growth if a multi-prongued strategy geared towards 
guaranteeing both the rights/safety of individuals and the interest of the national 
collectivity is developed in the near future. 
 
Secondly, a rational and effective population policy must entail the development of 
compatible supporting policies within the different ministries for maximal effect. As it 
stands, family planning clinics are being developed within the governmental health 
care sector, while at the same time, recently formulated social services policies hint 
to a contradictory pro-natalist policy in terms of both its assumptions and visions 
regarding the role of women in society as well as in terms of the distribution of 
benefits 71. Likewise, an effective policy needs to address the rising problem of un-
employment and inequity that is gripping the area more than ever before. In the 
absence or the sub-minimal presence  of social safety net or family support, or 
social security and old age benefits, it is highly unlikely that the Palestinian 
population will consider a serious reduction in family size, as families today, more 
than ever perhaps, are the pillar on which family welfare stands. Finally, an effective 
policy needs to also address the issue of health education in schools. As it stands, 
such schemes have been either abscent altogether from  school curricula, or 
represent un-scientific representations of current knowledge. 
 
An effective population policy also needs to address the problem of the restructuring 
of health care services and improving the quality of services as well. It has been 
repeatedly shown that women's and reproductive health and rights - the rights of 
people to determine the number and spacing of children - and women's health are 
key to an effective reduction in fertility. In the meanwhile, current health care 
services are operating on minimal budgets, in archaic ways, and primarily geared 
towards the old style maternal and child health care services which can defeat the 
purpose of effective population policies. In the Palestinian context, an effective 
evolution and restructuring of health care services is quite possible, especially in 
view of the models of women's health and reproductive health services already 
developed by local non-governmental organizations. There is every reason to 
believe that interactions between the governmental and non-governmental sectors 
could facilitate the changes needed in the governmental health care services that 
have been stunted and distorted by the years of military rule. 
 
                                                          
71 I lost the article, Penny! Do you have the reference? 
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An enlightened interventionist policy has been shown to have far reaching changes, 
even within the context of an Islamic society. Indeed, the example of Iran and 
Tunisia are cases in point. In the Iranian case, an active debate on the dynamics of 
population policy and women's rights and responsibilities, combined by the 
government's effort to build public consensus on the need for borth control and 
family planning, and the consequent introduction reforms in the areas of marriage, 
divorce and education  has proven to be instrumental in affecting change72. The 
success of Tunisia's population policy has been relegated to the introduction of 
successive changes in the law, including banning marriage of women under the age 
of 17, banning of the marriage of more than one wife, the regularization of divorce, 
restructuring of school curricula and the expansion of educational institutions and 
networks, the establishment of the National Family Planning Council that sets 
policies and outlines plans of action, and expansion of health and family planning 
services to rural areas, as well as guaranteeing women's rights. Political will, 
combined with legal changes and improvements in the status of women were shown 
to be key elements in the success of Tunisia's population policy73 
 
In the Palestinian context, the stage is set for an active and enlightened 
governmental intervention in the area of population, in active cooperation with an 
already existing and experienced network of health as women's non-governmental 
organizations. Effective change that takes into primary consideration people's quality 
of life the rights of women to control their own lives and the right of  families to make 
the choice of their ideal family size is possible with consultation, cooperation, 
initiating public debates and building national consensus from the bottom upwards, 
and can achieve dramatic results in a short period of time. Within this framework, 
key legal changes and the improvement in the status of women, through education, 
employment, and the provision of equal rights remains an important key to success. 
 
 
 
                                                          
72 Hoodfar, H., Devices and Desires: Population Policy and Gender Roles in 
the Islamic Republic, Middle East Report, 24(190) 1994, pp.11-17. 
73  Tunisian Population Policy and National Family Planning Programme, 
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